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Swat lies in the strategic region at the juncture of the Indian subcontinent, China, and Central Asia. For most of its known history, Swat retained its separate entity. It remained prominent as a centre of cultural diffusion and a cradle of civilization and witnessed encounters of formidable armies and civilizations: The archaeological remains and the historical and cultural treasures of the area provide ample evidences of human activities to scholars, archaeologists and historians, to study the area and its people's unique nature. In the present paper an attempt has been made to evaluate and analyse Mughul Swat relations from Babur to Awrangzib’s reign.

The sixteenth century proved a turning point in the history of Swat when the Yusufzai Afghans Pukhtuns occupied the land. The advent of the Yusufzais’ marked a mass migration and Invasion for the first time in the history of Swat by Muslims against their brethren in faith.

At that time, the last decade of the fifteenth century, Swat was in the possession of the Pukhtuns commonly known as Swati Pukhtuns. Sultān Uwais (Uways) was the chief ruler of Swat. The Yusufzais’ established matrimonial relations with the Sultān, but had their ambitions for the valley. The fertile land 'and rich pastures of Swat tempted them. They worked out their plan foiled defensive measures of the Swatis by a stratagem and occupied Lower Swat. By the sixteenth century Lower Swat was in the possession of the Yusufzais but their advance came to-a-halt for-the-time belng.

Bābur speaks of Sultān 'Ala al-Din and Sultān Uways of Swat as the two sultāns of Swat and their waiting on him at the time of his campaign in Bajawar (also Bajaur). Sultan Uways was in agreement with Babur. He served Babur in Bajawar. Bābur sent him to collect the impost levied on the Kahraj people. Babur treated both Sultan 'Ala al-Din and Sultan Uways well and with honour. Moreover, he asked the Yusufzais, in the final agreement with them, that "they should make no inroads into Swad (Swat) above Anuha (probably Abuha in the then Upper Swat)."

The Yusufzais gained footing in Swat, while Babur made himself master of Kabul. Collision between the two sides was unavoidable, because one of Babur's routes to India fell within the domain of the Yusufzais. With the intention of attacking the Yusufzais, Babur marched for Swat and dismounted in between the water of Panjkora and the united waters of Jandol 'and Bajawar. He however, refrained from advancing into Swat, because not only the Yusutzais were coming into greater importance at the time but he had also found from experience "the difficulty of subduing them by open force in the rugged country which they occupied." He used diplomacy and tactics instead of arms. He "sought to conciliate [the]
men whom it was not always easy to, chastise or to reach, by asking in marriage the daughter of Malik Shah Mansur, one of their chiefs.\textsuperscript{10} He not only concluded a pact with but also established matrimonial relation with the Yusufzais by marrying Shah Mansur’s daughter, Bibi Mubarikah*. "This union ... gave him a strong and intimate connection with the tribe, assisted in checking the customary raids and outrages of several of its branches."\textsuperscript{11}

Some writers see elements of fantasy and romance in the marriage of Babur with Bibi Mubarikah.\textsuperscript{12} Babur's account neither give any clue of the legends and fantasies nor his statement corroborate these. The marriage was arranged for political and diplomatic gains rather than Baber's love for the lady. Babur admits by stating that "in order to conciliate the Yusufzai horde, I had asked for a daughter of one of my well wishers, Malik Sulaiman Shah’s son Malik Shah Mansur, at the time he came to me as envoy from the Yusufzai Afghans."\textsuperscript{13}

Some writers have mentioned that Babur came up to Upper Swat; and that he had crossed the river to Manglawar and had ravaged the vicinity of Manglawar.\textsuperscript{14} But Babur neither entered Swat nor went up to Manglawar against Sultan Uways. He achieved his goal with the conclusion of the pact and the establishment of matrimonial alliance with the Yusufzais. As has already been stated that the Swati rulers, Sultan Ala al-Din and Sultan Uways, were already in alliance with and were present in Babur's camp at Bajawar at the time of his intending attack on the Yusufzais. Both of them were asked, with the accomplishment of their tasks, to go back with honour. Babur states, in this respect, that "we bestowed horses and robe on SI [Sultan] Wais and SI ‘Ala’u’u’din of Sawad (Swat), gave them leave to go."\textsuperscript{15} So there was no need of action and march up to Manglawar. A cursory glance on \textit{Tuzuk-i-Baburi} reveals the fact.\textsuperscript{16}

The Yusufzais of Swat retained their independent position during Babur’s, Kamran’s and Hurnayun’s reign. Swat remained un-penetrated by the Mughuls till Akbar’s time. Akbar ascended the throne in 1556, but he did not succeed to rule over Swat nor "any territories west of the Indus until 1581, and not absolutely until his brother Hakim's death in 1585."\textsuperscript{17} The real issue between the Swat Yusufzais and the Mughuls starts after the death of Mirza Hakim. "On 20\textsuperscript{th} December 1585 Akbar sent an army to conquer Kashmir and on the same day Zain Khan Koka (Kukah) was sent off to guide aright the Yusufzais and to conquer Swad (Swat) and Bajaur."\textsuperscript{18}

\* Later this lady Bibi Mubarikah, was able to convey Babur remains to Kabul with the permission of Sher Shah Suri, himself a Pukhtun (Pathan) – Ed.
The contention and belief that Akbar's forces proceeded to Swat against the Roshniyahs, seems to have no relevance. Neither Bayazid Ansari nor afterwards the Roshniyahs gained support in Swat. Akhund Darwizah did not mention presence of the Roshniyahs nor his debate with Bayazid Ansari (founder of the sect) in Swat. He had mentioned the territories outside Swat. Moreover, at the time of the advance of the Mughul forces to Swat, the Roshniyah influence had begun to fade away and the tribal tide had begun to go against them in the Yusufzai Samah (plain) because of the strong opposition by Akhund Darwizah.

Besides the insubordination of the Swatis it was the Kashmir issue which caused the march of the Akbar's forces to Swat. Akbar considered Kashmir to be under the influence of his empire. He asked the ruler to acknowledge his supremacy. The demand was not honoured. Akbar, at last sent Rajah Bagwan Das with an army, in 1585, to Kashmir to enforce his authority. It was the strategic need of encountering any possible help from the Swatis to the Kashmiris as well as the need to maintain "the line of communications for this expedition [that] a force was sent under Zain Khan against the Yusufuzais in the Swat valley."

Anyway, Akbar's imperialism led to fighting. The Mughul forces sent under the command of Zayn Khan faced stiff resistance and suffered great hardships. Zayn Khan reported that:

While he had been able to force an entry into Bajaur (Bajawar), he was powerless to proceed to the heart of the trouble in Swat until reinforcements reached him. These reinforcements must also harry and devastate the Mandanr settlements in the Samah to prevent their aiding their brethren in the hills. Akbar agreed and dispatched two forces, one under his Brahmin favorite Raja Birbal (Birbar, or the very courageous), and the other under another of his cronies, Hakim Abul Fath.

The reinforcement entered Swat in 1586 with great difficulty. Chakdara was made the base and foundation of a fort was laid there. From there the combined forces made their bid for Buner. But the Yusufzais took them to task at the Karakar Pass. The Mughul forces met disaster. Rajah Birbal lost his life along with eight thousand Mughul soldiers. Thus, the first campaign not only "resulted in failure in so far as the Yusufzais in Swat and Buner could not be brought under control" but it "created a terror of Afghan prowess and aversion to hill lighting throughout the imperial dominions." Moreover, the defeat of the Mughul forces not only "left a very demoralising effect on the Imperial army" but also proved a final blow for the Mughul forces sent into Kashmir under the command of Rajah Bhagwandas and Mirza Shah Rukh. They yielded before the dispirited forces of the
ruler of Kashmir and concluded a peace treaty with him on such terms that "did not satisfy Akbar."\(^{32}\)

The Mughuls once more made a bid under the command of Zayn Khan and fought in Bsjawar and Swat from 1587 to 1592 "but without any real or lasting success"\(^{33}\). The Mughul historians have exaggerated the exploits of the Mughul forces. Their accounts portray that the Yusufzais were crushed and reduced to great straits.\(^{34}\) But according to Ahmad Hasan Dani:

A battle of game started between the Yusufzais and the Mughals in which hill forts played a dominant role ... The Mughals learnt the tactics of hill lighting from the Yusufzais and as long as they held the forts they managed to keep the passage open. However, except for this passage over Malakand to Chakdara and beyond to Bajawar, the Mughals, never attempted to enter the main home of the Yusufzais in Swat andBuner.\(^{35}\)

It is to be noted that, beside other things, H.W. Bellew contends that the Mughul general, Zayn Khan Kukah, "built the fort of Damghar\(^{36}\) in the midst of ... [the] valley, and leaving a garrison in it, scoured the country around, and severely punished the Yusufzais for their insolence.\(^{37}\) It, however, is noteworthy that Bellew did not mention the source of his contention in respect of the construction of the fort at Damghar by the Mughul general.

Olaf Caroe's statement endorses Dani's contention. He states that:

There is other, and even better, evidence as regards Swat, Buner and Bajaur, the hill tracts showing that they never came under Imperial control. In his Ain-i-Akbari, Abul Fazl includes these areas in the Sarkar of Swat under the Kabul Province. Throughout the Ain there are ruled columns for particulars respecting the names of places, people and number of men available for service and the amount of assessment. These, for the parts in question, are all blank. 'The fact is', says Raverty, 'the Mughal rulers never obtained a permanent footing in these parts, notwithstanding the slaughter of the people and the devastation of their lands. They were never in a position for obtaining the particulars for the said columns to be filled up, and no copy of the Ain-i-Akbari will be found complete in this respect.' The Mughals were unable to hold an inch of ground in this difficult country without overwhelming forces, and even then their communications were continually interrupted.\(^{38}\)
Even Abu'l Fadi, Akbar's favourite and historian, admits insubordination of the people of the Sarkar of Swat by recording that "under the present ever during Imperial sway, of the lawless Inhabitant of this country have been put to death, others imprisoned *while some happily dwell under their tribal rule* [Italics added]."  

The failure of Akbar's forces and might in Swat proved decisive. His successors Jahangir and Shahjahan did not make bid for Swat. In Awranqzib's reign the Swat's Yusufzais came to the help of their brethren in the plains, who were fighting against the Mughuls (In 1667). In reprisal, the Mughul commander entered the Swat valley and destroyed a village but returned in haste.  

Khushal Khan Khattak, who himself and his ancestors had served the Mughuls and helped them against the Yusufzais to their utmost (which Khushal Khan himself admitted), at his fall in favours of the Mughul Emperor Awrangzib, endeavoured to instigate all the Pukhtun Tribes against him. He visited Swat as well. But the people of Swat did not side with him, because relations between Awrangzeb and their brethren, the Yusufzais of the plain' area had already become cordial. Mian Noor's (Nur's) role, because of contrast in his and Khushal Khan's ideas and beliefs, also contributed to the failure of Khushal Khan's mission in Swat, for which he had despised both Mian Nur and the Swatis.  

Moreover the Swatis had no quarrel and clashes of interest with Aurangzeb. They were neither his subject nor neighbours. Neither Awrangzeb had made attempts against swat like Akbar nor had usurped their independence. There was no ground and logic for the Swatis to take arms at the instigation and behest of a person, against Awrangzeb, who had not only remained loyal to the Mughuls but served them to his best against the pukhtuns as well whose previous role and career was not only anti Pukhtuns but was anti-Yusufzai as well and "whose lather grandfather and great grandfather had died fighting the Yusulzais" for the cause of the Mughuls.

Conclusion:

The Mughuls either failed to incorporate Swat in their domain or had made no attempt for it Instead of proceeding to Swat and fighting the Yusufzai of Swat, Babur deemed it wise to conclude a truce with them and so did not molest their independence. Humayun and Kamran had made no attempt for Swat. Akbar's endeavours and imperialism led him to invade Swat but the Swatis held their position and possession on the whole, and the Mughul forces not only suffered great losses but also met an ultimate failure to hold Swat. Jahangir and Shahjahan made no bid for Swat. Awrangzib’s lighting against the
Yusufzais of the plain area once more involved the Swatis against the Mughul forces and caused the march of a Mughul contingent up to the Swat's borders but retreated immediately.

It is strange, as has already been stated, that some writers have brought Babur to Swat, in their accounts, as far as Manglawar, and account of Muhammad Asif Khan states that "in short, Swat and Buner remained a part of the Mughul Empire throughout Aurangzeb’s reign." Olaf Caroe had recorded to the contrary statement of the Miangul Abdul Wadud, who states that "never in all history ... not even in the time of Akbar or Aurangzeb much less under the Durranis, were the Yusufzais of this country the subjects of any empire." Caroe endorses the claim by writing at:

The claim can be made good. The people of Dir, Swat and Buner have never paid taxes to Delhi or Kabul. They have never had to yield obedience to any foreign law or administrative system.

Khushal Khan Khattak, who visited Swat, as has already been mentioned for instigating the Yusufzais of Swat against Awrangzeb had also endorsed freedom of the Yusufzais of Swat. He says that "neither are they the subjects of anyone nor they give away anything to anybody."
Notes and References:


5. Ibid .. pp. 375-76.

6. William Erskine, *A History of India under Baber*, with an introduction by P Hardy, repr., Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1974, p. 338; idem, A' History of India under the Two First Sovereigns of the House of Timur; Baber and Humayun, vol. 1, 2nd ed, Irish University Press, Shannan, 1972, p. 328, The Yusutzias resumed their advance during the reign of Humayun (IGIPSNWFP, P. 217) and sultan Uways was expelled from his possessions in Upper Swat as well, He was forced to retire to the Caufir [Kafir] country, where he founded a new monarchy, which was enjoyed for some generations by his descendants." Etphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Cabul*, vol. 2, pp. 9-11 (quoted in Dani, *Peshawar*, p. 96). Most of the old Swati Pukhtuns left Swat, They occupied the cis-Indus territories, which fall in the modern Hazara Division, where they still dwell. The Yusufzais took Upper Swat as for as Ayin, near Baranyal (now Bahrain) beyond which they have scarcely advanced (IGIPSNWE, p. 217). For understanding the factors responsible for the stability of this ethnic border, Fredrik Barth had examined, in 1950s, the specific requirements of the Pukhtun economy and organization. While stating that the 'Pathan territory, extends to a critical ecologic threshold; the limits within which two crops can be raised each year: (Fredrik Barth, "Ecological Relationships of Ethnic Groups in Swat, North Pakistan: American Anthropologist 58 (December 1956), 1981) he claims that "the conclusion that the limits of double cropping constitute an effective check on further Pathan expansion seems unavoidable." [Ibid.]


10. Ibid., idem, India under Baber and Humayun, vol. 1, p. 338.

11. Ibid.

12. See Khan, Maleka-i-Swat, pp. 32-45; idem, Yusufzai Qaum ki Sarguzasht pp. 109-19; Shah, Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khan, pp. 92-103.

13. Babur, Babur-Nama, p. 375; idem, Tuzuk-i-Babur, p. 149.


For the account of Akhund Darwizah, about Babur’s expedition to Bajawar, his affairs and settlement with the Yusufzais of Swat, and his passage through Swat see Bellew, A General Report on the Yusufzais, pp. 61-64.


18. Akbar Nama, trans. H. Beveridge, vol. 3, p. 715 quoted in Dani, Peshawar. p. 102. Whereas according to Nizam ai-Din Ahmad it was "on the [next day]" that Akbar sent Zain Khan Kukah "with a well equipped army against the Afghans of Sawad (Swat) and Bajaur, for the extirpation of those turbulent tubes," Khwajah Nizam al-Din Ahmad, The Tabaqat-i-Akbari: (A History of India from the early Musalman Invasions to the thirty-eight year of the reign of Akbar), vol. 2, trans, Brajendra Nath De. rev. and ed, Baini Prashad, low Price Publications, Delhi, 1992, p. 607.


20. Akhund Darwizah was disciple of Sayyad Ali Tarmidhi alias Pir Baba and a staunch opponent of Bayazid Ansari and his teachings and beliefs. His fame is also because of his books *Makhzan* (Pashto/Persian) and *Tadhkirat- al-Abrar wa'l Ashrar* (Persian).

21. For Bayazid Ansari, his doctrines and beliefs see Sultan-i-Rome, "Bayazid Ansari and his Khairul Bayan", *Hamdard Islamicus*, (Karachi) No. 20 (July-September, 1997), pp. 87-95


23. It is further strange to note that Muhammad Abdul Ghafur Qasmi not only had brought Bayazid Ansari to Swat and Akhund Darwizah in his pursuit, but has also recorded the fiction about Bayazid's challenge to Akhund Darwizah to show his *kiramat*; consequently the Katilai (now Aman Kot) spring ensued due to Akhund Darwizah prayers and Bayazid's trick failed. See Abdul Ghafur Qasmi, *Tarikh Riyasat-i-Swat* (Pasnto), Hamidia Press, Peshawar. 1939. pp. 33-34. It is noteworthy that this story has been omitted in the English translation of the book, i.e., Qasimi *The History of Swat*.

24. As we also see in the case of Alexander the Great at the lime of his march towards Punjab and in the case of Babur before his attempts for India.


[One of the reasons of the defeat was the fact that Birbal overruled Zayn Khan's recommendations – Ed.].


32. Ibid., pp. 59-51.

[Rajah, however, had persuaded Yusuf Chak, to accept allegiance on promises of good treatment and rewards. Akbar overruled and ordered imprisonment of the Chak chief. It is-said Bhagwandas felt humiliated and committed suicide– Ed.].


34. See Ahmad, *The Tabaqat-i-Akbari*. vol. 2, pp. 610-11, 649; *Akbar Namah*, vol. 3, pp. 73, 76-77 vide Ansari, "*The North-West Frontier Policy of the Mughals under Akbar*", p. 51.

35. For a condensed version of Akhund Darwizah's account in this respect see Bellew, *A General Report on the Yusufzais*, pp. 167-68, Also see ibid., p.72.


37. The village of Damghar lies in between the present Saidu Sharif (Kanju) airport and the Swat River.


42. Ibid., p. 149. Also see Sabir, *Tarikh Subah Sarhad*, p. 334.


44. Mian Noor (Nur) was a grandson of Akhund Darwizah and a revered religious person in Swat at that time. He had his differences with Khushal Khan over his views about Akhund Darwizah’s religious stature and criticism of his book *Makhzan*. Khushal Khan alleges that he was a Mughul agent also. For details see Khushal Khan Khattak, *Swat Namah ot Khushal Khan Khattak*, ed. and trans. Shakeel Abmad, with Preface by Raj Wali Shah Khattak, Pashto Academy, Peshawar, n.d.

45. See *Swat Namah ot Khushal Khan Khattak*, ed. and trans. Shakeel Ahmad, passim.


47. For references see n. 14 above. For Akhund Darwizah’s account about Babur’s passing through Swat see Bellew, *A General Report on the Yusufzais*, p. 62.

48. The writer of the auto biography of Miangul Abdul Wadud, the ruler of Swat State (1917-49) with Preface, Introduction, and Appendices by him.


51. Ibid.