Swat valley after emergency

By: Khadim Hussain

Many believed that General Musharraf would act swiftly against the militants in Swat valley after he imposed emergency in Pakistan on November 3, 2007. There are several reports in the newspapers these days that the militants have captured more installations over the last few days. According to the reports of the local residents, the whole valley from Kanju to Kalam has come under the control of the Taliban over the last few days. Inamullah, a teacher and social worker report: “The Taliban entered our village (Bahrain) the other day with heavy weapons mounted on a cavalcade of vehicles snatched from government officials. They delivered a speech on a megaphone near a police station and ordered the police to surrender and submit their weapons to them. The police had left the building just an hour ago and a group of local people was entrusted to guard the building. A few hours earlier the village elders had decided not to confront the Taliban and persuade them to stay away from the area assuring them there would be no security personnel stationed in and around the village. The local people had decided to be impartial in the fighting between the Taliban and the security forces. It was a historic day and I saw some very interesting scenes. The Taliban moved forward through the valley and halted in Kalam town where local elders negotiated with them. Now they have moved back to their stronghold and we hope our area (the upper hilly area of district Swat) will be safe from any impending military operation against the Taliban. There are also reports that several security personnel thought it safe to flee from the valley.”

Federal Minister for Political Affairs, Amir Muqam, expressed disappointment over the deteriorating situation in the Swat valley. “Unfortunately, there has been no improvement or sign of improvement in the situation on the ground even after the promulgation of emergency.” The people of the whole valley feel themselves hostage to Maulana Fazlullah and his 500 diehard militants based in the villages of Mamderhai, Koza Bandai, Ningwalai, and Bara Bandai. According to the residents, there may be some 3,000 sympathisers of the Maulana who might support him but might not accompany him in resisting the security forces. The residents of upper Swat have started migrating either to the lower part of the valley or to other parts of the country. Educational institutions, business markets and government offices are closed down. The people living in the affected areas are terrorised after some eight beheaded bodies of the security personnel were shown to the people by the militants to cow down the people a few weeks ago.

Maulana Fazlur Rehman, leader of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), said that the situation worsened in Swat as a result of the reaction of the masses against the policies of the present regime. In his view, the regime’s support for the US’s war on terror might be the main reason behind the insurgency. In the same vein, the interim government of NWFP announced that it would reinforce the Shariah code earlier promulgated to appease the defunct Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in the mid-1990s. As both of these assumptions are based on erroneous ideas, both seem to clearly miss the real target. In fact, a vast majority of the population in the valley has already lost trust in the religious leadership due to their inability to respond to the real problems of the people.

The religious leadership has ruled the province since the elections in 2002. Presently, Maulana Fazlur Rehman has become a blue-eyed boy of the military regime after the imposition of emergency. Sirajul Haque, ameer Jamaat-e-Islami NWFP, called a jirga in Chakdara on October 30, 2007 to gather support for Maulana Fazlullah who had been allowed by the MMA government to continue his activities. The jirga called upon the government to end the military operation in the valley. The local Taliban of Bajaur and Mohmand Agency also announced their support for Maulana Fazlullah on the same day. One may see a clear pattern of external and internal factors instrumental in bringing the valley to the present stage. One has to be conscious of the distinctive features of the valley. The situation in the valley begs a separate analysis from the situation in FATA.

The prominent among the external factors are the weakening of political institutions and the wave of militarisation in the era of Ziaul Haq in the 1980s. The Afghan war and Zia’s dictatorship in a symbiotic relationship dialectically opposed political institutionalisation in the whole country, especially in Swat that remained under autocracy for almost a century. During the 1980s and the 90s, foreign funding in the shape of petro-dollars helped permeate the Wahabi interpretation of Islam in a previously balanced socio-cultural fabric of the valley. Traditional elites, divided into two prominent social groups, had to give space to the religious and the marginalised groups because of the politics of social grouping.

The existence of two groups would guarantee a balance in the exercise of political power. The lack of political process in the country did not allow the indigenous socio-cultural and socio-political institutions to evolve after the merger of the valley with Pakistan in 1969. The merger of the valley created another vacuum. The previously responsive judicial structure was replaced with a judicial code termed Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The people of the valley had neither familiarity nor patience with the lengthy procedures of litigation. They were frustrated with the whole judicial process. The Supreme Court of Pakistan disbanded PATA in the early 90s.

Maulana Sufi Mohammad of the defunct TNSM apparently capitalised on this frustration of the people to launch his movement for the promulgation of his code of Shariah in the early 1990s. The demands of Maulana Fazlullah seem to address the same old frustration of the people. The Maulana is probably not interested to address the issues related to the economic sustenance of the people. Some observers believe that the role of the national and international agencies cannot be ruled out in creating the present situation of the valley. These observers are of the opinion that the US might be interested in containing the march of the Chinese to the Gwadar Port through the Karakoram Highway to have an access route to the Central Asian oil reserves that might become instrumental in keeping the US trade interests at bay in the region.

The local residents in Matta, Durushkhela and Ningolai told this scribe that they had seen the militants of Jaish-e-Mohammad, and those who might have come from Waziristan, helping the local Taliban in bringing upper Swat under their control. The key to understanding the internal factors lies in understanding the composition of Maulana Fazlullah’s supporters. The majority of the supporters belong to the lower rung of the social structure – the vocational groups who do not have a share in the land distribution of the area. The Maulana communicates with them in their language through his FM radio, gives them recognition, and owns them as his colleagues. The supporters of the Maulana derive a sense of empowerment in their state of powerlessness. Both the state and the traditional elites, along with the political elites of the valley, have unfortunately failed to respond to the aspirations of the marginalised in Swat valley. This is where the jihadist interpretation found its way.

This is not to say that the interpretation of Maulana Fazlullah aims at getting empowerment for the marginalised groups of Swat valley. None of his demands ask for the development of infrastructure, employment, conservation of natural resources, development of socio-cultural institutions such as education, healthcare and transportation. Even if the government acquiesces to the demands of the Maulana, the common people and the marginalised groups of the valley will remain powerless and poor. The demands of the Maulana include wearing of head-to-toe veil for women, banning NGOs, closing down CD shops, and implementation of what he terms ‘Islamic punishments’ for wrongdoers.

The writer is a socio-political analyst based in Islamabad