Hoping against hope

By: Aimal Khan

The NWFP government has signed a temporary truce with the militants in Swat and attempts are under way to resume peace talks with the militants in tribal areas as well. The fresh peace initiatives are yet to materialise, but the plight of the common people is only worsening, as the militants are bent upon pursuing their rigid agenda. After initial contacts between the government and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organisation of different militant groups, the extremists are once again out to enforce their brand of Sharia on others.

The TPP is active in South and North Waziristan, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies, Darra Adamkhel, and other tribal areas, besides some districts of the NWFP. Mulla Fazalullah is again on air daily on his notorious illegal FM radio in Swat and the militants have started issuing warning letters asking the people in threatening tone to follow and abide by their extremist version of Islam. To appease the militants, the NWFP government is poised to introduce Sharia regulations in the Malakand division, the third attempt of this kind since the emergence of the Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in 1994.

Unfortunately, peace initiatives are dictated mainly by the 'strategic' concerns of the government, rather than the 'human' ones. As a result, it seems that the authorities are more interested in checking the attacks on security forces and government installations, rather than lessening hardships of the common people living in the conflict zone. By compromising on fundamental rights for political expediency, the government has left the common people at the mercy of the militants, who are always looking for an opportunity to impose their brand of Islam on others.

The piecemeal approach adopted by the government and other channels involved in peace talks with the militants may be well thought out and coordinated, but in practice such approaches do not bring long-term results due to various limitations. In addition, sustainable peace is not possible in the region unless the country's Afghan as well as Indian policy is brought under the civilian domain. A section of the Pakistani establishment still fears that peace and stability in Afghanistan will end Pakistan's strategic influence in the war-affected country, and is, therefore, unwilling to disengage with the Afghan Taliban.

Since launching military operations in the tribal areas, the government has negotiated several peace deals with the militants for bringing peace to the region, as well as for correcting its strategic errors of the past. These deals, however, have so far failed to check violence; stop cross-border terrorism; expel foreign terrorists from the Pakistani territory; and, more importantly, improve the law and order situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) and adjoining areas.

In April 2003, the Pakistan Army started hunt operations in the socio-culturally backward tribal areas, where the pro-Taliban sentiments were and still very strong. The situation worsened due to the army's deployment and military operations, which showed no respect for local sensitivities and traditions. The situation in the tribal areas and some parts of the NWFP cannot be seen in isolation, as it is inter-linked with the global 'war on terror'. Being one of the hottest sectors in this war, several local and non-local state and non-state actors have got entrenched against each other on the Pakistani soil.

To counter militancy, billions of dollars were poured in by the United States, but all in vain. In all, Pakistan received $ 10.56 billion from the US for military, economic and development activities from 2002 to 2007. Of this, only $ 5.8 billion were directed towards combatting terrorism in Fata and regions bordering Afghanistan. About 96 per cent of this funding to Fata and regions Afghanistan was spent on military efforts, and only one per cent on developmental assistance.

The US has always remained critical of peace agreements between the Pakistani government and the militants. It keeps on pressurising Pakistan to continue fighting against the terrorists and not to disrupt the military operations aimed at destroying their safe havens. It also maintains that violence did not decrease in Afghanistan after such peace agreements; on the contrary, it increased. Striking public or secret deals with the militants are part of a government's exit strategy. Considering the fate of previous such agreements, one cannot attach high hopes with the proposed peace deal. The government can sign a deal with the militants, but its implementation and sustainability will be a big challenge.

Some of the stated reasons for entering into such deals are to neutralise the local militants; to register foreign militants and subsequently ensure either their expulsion or isolation; to check attacks on government installations and personnel; and to create an enabling environment for political, economic and developmental activities to take off in the tribal areas. Such deals usually have two components: public and secret. More often than not, the secret commitments are in direct contradiction to the public ones. It will be naive to think that after the signing of any peace deal with the government, the militants will agree to expel foreign militants or stop cross-border attacks or scrap their parallel administrative structures.

Keeping in mind the track record of such peace deals, the government always plays on a weak wicket while the militants gain a lot by securing the release of their prisoners, getting compensation for their material and human losses, and the freedom to run parallel administration. The government also often faces strong criticism from the US and its allies for making deals with its arch-enemies. Why the authorities need to strike deal with nearly the same elements time and again? Whether the government lacks a strategic vision or capitulates to the external pressure or appeases the militants, the deals so far have failed to check the spectre of militancy. A successful peace deal must ensure peace in the tribal area, decrease in the cross-border illegal movement, neutralise foreign militants in the tribal areas, establish the rule of law, ensure and protect citizens' fundamental rights, and scrap parallel administrative structures run by the militants.

(The writer is a political observer and works with Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad.)